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Abstract 
The content authenticity of the multimedia delivery is important issue with rapid development and widely used of 
multimedia technology. Till now many authentication solutions had been proposed, such as cryptology and 
watermarking based methods. However, in latest heterogeneous network the video stream transmission has b een 
coded in scalable way such as H.264/SVC, there is still no  good authentication solution. In this paper, we firstly 
summarized related works and p roposed a scalable content authentication scheme using a ratio of different energy 
(RDE) based perceptual hashing in Q/S dimension, which is used Dempster-Shafer theory and combined with the 
latest scalable video coding (H.264/SVC) construction. The idea of “sign once and verify in scalable way ” can be 
realized. Comparing with  previous methods, the proposed scheme based on  perceptual has hing outperforms 
previous works in uncertainty (robustness) and efficiencies in the H.264/SVC video streams. At last, the experiment 
results verified the performance of our scheme.   
Keywords: Dempster-Shafer theory, scalability, video authentication, uncertainty 
1. Introduction 
Multimedia data is the most important information that 
human can recognize and understand. With the 
development of multimedia services and network 
communication technology nowadays, we ca n 
conveniently acquire various multimedia information 
such as video, audio, and others media, even at any time 
and any place. Due to adopting some new scalable video 
coding and transmission mechanisms (H.264/SVC) 
people can e ven consume same video contents in 
broadcast way via various terminates such as home TV, 
PC or mobile TV without transcoding [1, 2] (see Figure 
1). However the security of delivery of these video 
contents has become a cruci al problem including 
solutions to the confidentiality, originality, integrity and 
so on. Traditional security method such as encry ption 
and data hashing, such as AES and SHA algorithms etc, 
are usually adopted to protect data contents. And in later 
years watermarking methods are developing especially 
in copyright applications. These two ways are m ain 
research directions in multimedia security till now. 
Although it may be achi eved good performance in 
traditional ways, it seem s not adaptive to the latest 
heterogeneous multimedia networks in which scalable 
video coding has been adopted.  
 
Fig.1. H.264/SVC scalable video distribution. 
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In this paper we will fo cus the multimedia content 
authentication issue. Multimedia authentication 
techniques have been used for protecting the originality 
and integrality of multimedia contents and can tell us 
whether or not the c ontents received are tampered or 
authentic [3]. The related works can be divided into two 
groups including digital signature and watermarking. 
The former utilizes encryption algorithm to extract hash 
codes from image or other multimedia data as signature, 
and the hash code is saved in header file or other extra 
space transmitting with the image. When authentication 
is needed, signature produced in the same way will be 
compared with signature saved before. If they match, 
then received multimedia data is authentic. The latte r 
utilize semi fragile watermarking to v erify the 
originality of received contents, and hot t o design the 
watermarking algorithm is t he key point in 
authentication. As we know, cryptology based hash or 
signature will be quite different when introducing even 
a bit modification at th e input. This is no t obviously 
practice in real multimedia transmission or processing 
applications. And pure watermarking based 
authentication scheme seems more vulnerable to attacks 
such as va rious watermarking attacks or delicate 
authentication attacks due to watermarks are i nherent 
visual redundancy information in multimedia data.  
Perceptual hashing (P-Hashing) is a latest technique for 
the authentication of multimedia content [12]. It works 
by computing hash values from features of multimedia 
data. Compared to conventional hashing and signature, 
the idea perceptual hashing has the advantage that they 
will not change when multimedia data undergoes 
common processing while detecting malicious 
modifications. This kind of percept ual hashing seems a 
good option for multimedia content authentication, 
especially in the public transmission channel. For video 
authentication, some video hashing had been proposed 
and can achieve trade-off between robustness and 
discrimination [19-25]. However, as we mentioned 
above, there is still n o good authentication solution to 
the scalable video coding (H.264/SVC) streams content 
in latest heterogeneous networks. In the scalable video 
coding streams broadcast system, the server coding once 
and receiver can decoding in many ways. So how to 
secure the authenticity of SVC co ntents delivery and 
make it “Sign once and verify it in scalable way” is th e 
key point of our works. Till now there are some works 
have been done including cryptology hashing, 
watermarking method. However, perceptual hashing 
based scalable authentication method for SVC videos 
seems a new solution someone seldom proposed.  
The main contribution of this paper is that we proposed 
a new scalable perceptual video hashing can maintain 
invariance output result when the scalable visual content 
had not changed and can discriminate malicious 
modifications. Our scheme is adapted to the three 
dimensions’ structure of H.264/SVC including spatial 
layers and quality layers as well as temporal layers. The 
features extracted from quality layers and spatial layers 
belong to same frame contents were constructed and 
further produced on invariance perceptual hash bits 
which are used for authentication in different receivers. 
Due to our hash bits generated from visual content 
features, different layers of same content ca n be 
authenticated using only one hash. If so me layer or 
packet discarded, it will no t affect authentication result. 
Regarding tampers in temporal axis such as dropping, 
reordering, the time stamp and NAL packets ID can tell 
the original order of frames and GOPs and discriminate 
malicious temporal tampers from normal fame rate 
changes. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In next 
section we summarized some latest related works about 
scalable video authentication. Section 3 described our 
proposed quality or spatial layer b ased perceptual 
hashing (Q/S based P-Hashing) scheme and how to 
achieve the invariance features from different spatial 
layers and quality layers. In the last sectio n some 
experiments result in H.264/SVC streams was given as 
well as conclusions and future works. 
2. Related Works 
In [3], different approaches of multimedia 
authentication include conventional cryptography, 
fragile and semi-fragile watermarking and digital 
signatures that are based on the im age content were 
summarized. Although the  classification and 
performance comparison analysis for different 
authentication methods are given by the author in details, 
the authentication for scalable multimedia distribution 
was not mentioned. In the early related works for 
scalable image coding such as JPEG 2000, C Peng et al 
proposed a flex ible and scalable authentication scheme 
based on the Merkle hash tree and digital signature [8, 
19]. And it allo ws users to verify the authenticity and 
integrity of different sub-images extracted from a single 
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compressed codestream protected with a single digital 
signature.  
To the best of our knowledge, the earliest paper about 
video scalable authentication was by Sun QB et al  [5]. 
They considered t hree common MPEG video 
transcoding manipulations and combined error 
correction coding (ECC) and watermarking to design a 
content authentication scheme for scalable video 
streaming. Yan WQ et al proposed a sc alable video 
signature that can authenticate video contents at three 
hierarchical levels (key-frame, shot and video) [7], but it 
is implemented in the pixel domain of video frames and 
not suitable for practice scalable video coding mode, as 
well as th e authentication precision is a little co arse. 
According to MPEG-2 video authentication, Ye et al 
used multi-features extracted from coefficients of 
macro-blocks,   time order information and motion 
information to produce a signature for MPEG 
authentication. MPEG-4 is th e latest med ia stream 
processing standard which possesses the important 
“compress once, decompress many ways” property, Wu 
YD et al presente d three scalable a uthentication 
schemes for MPEG-4 streams in multicast and lossy 
networks [9] and share the novel property of “sign once, 
verify many ways”. In heterogeneous wireless networks, 
Gabriele et al proposed a loss tolerant video streaming 
authentication scheme mainly based on the video 
feature extraction idea [26]. In the e xperiments, feature 
difference indicator (FDI) an d two attacks are adopted 
to verify the sensitive of th e content feature extraction 
algorithm. This works can be referred in our feature 
hashing based scalable authentication scheme. However, 
all these above works are no t implemented in the 
H.264/SVC we mainly considered in this paper and 
which is more complex. So it is questionable whether or 
not they are suitable for scalable authentication for 
H.264/SVC. Subsequently, we summarized related 
works exactly in H.264/SVC streams. 
In [16, 17], Su-Wan Park et al em bedded reversible 
watermarks into the intra prediction mode (IPM) of 
H.264/SVC bit streams for authentication and encrypted 
the IPMs of 4×4 luma block, the sign bits of texture, and 
the sign bits of MV difference values in the intra frames 
and the inter frames. If th e watermark is co rrectly 
detected then the cipher content is decrypted. Although 
the visual quality of videos is no t degraded too much, 
the watermarking scheme has a little b it-overhead. And 
it is questionable whether or not watermarking only 
IPMs can protect the whole content of SVC video 
streams. In [ 10, 11], Mokhtarian et al proposed a n 
authentication scheme that accounts for the  full 
scalability of video streams, and enables verification of 
all possible sub-streams that can be extracted from the 
original stream, in which the adaptation for spatial, 
quality and temporal dimension are all co nsidered. In 
the scheme, the hashing generated from MGS (medium-
grained scalable) packets to layers, then to CGS (coarse-
grained scalable) and spatial layers, video frames to 
GOP according to temporal relation c onstructed a 
complex hash trees to au thentication video data in an y 
layers and this hash trees can also resist packets lossy as 
well as ada pt to different layers discarding case. 
Although this kind of cryptology hash based scheme 
achieved security, adaptive and computation 
performance to some extent, there still some p roblems 
can not be easily resolved. 
y Due to hash bits generated from every MGS 
packets and different layers s hould be attached in 
respective location, there is to o much communication 
overload even some improvement works was made such 
as generating hash bits from group truncation unit not 
individual one. 
y Due to cryptology hash can not resist even a bit 
change in video data, every bit modification of MGS 
blocks can ca use the fi nal frame or GOP can not pass  
the authentication while the v ideo content is still 
original.  
According to t hese problems, we c ombined perceptual 
video hashing and watermarking to design an 
authentication scheme adaptive to the three dimensions 
(S, Q and T) scalability of H.264/SVC video streams. 
3. Proposed Scheme  
Our scheme belongs to content based authentication. So 
how to design perceptual hashing that can both meet the 
requirement of scalab ility and sensitive to content 
changes. In addition, the system need some robustness 
to noise such as some bits change without affect video 
contents and this maybe often occur in real applications. 
Our scheme partly was in spired by the works in [5, 6, 
and 13] and based on the DCT robust features. Before 
illustrating our sch eme in detail, the structure of 
H.264/SVC streams should be introduced. When we say 
a frame in SVC, it is con stituted by different spatial, 
quality layers denoted by DID, QID. With the change of 
frame rate, the te mporal scalability is necessary. The  
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frame in higher temporal layer can on ly be predicted 
from the one in lower temporal layers and the TID is the 
ID of tem poral layers. In content authentication, ideal 
perceptual hash extracted from same content should be 
the same to each other, no matter what the resolution or 
quality is. So  it is n ature idea to extract same featu res 
from different spatial (resolution) or CGS (quality) 
layers included in one frame and can produce several 
same hashing bits sequence. It is so  called Q/S based 
Hashing in our scheme. Notice that H.264/SVC allows 
up to 8 spatial and 16 quality layers for one fram e, we 
select the fra me of base la yer to extract main features 
and select e nhancement frame to e xtract enhancement 
features for authentication. This will reduce th e hash 
computation while not missing the significant content 
need to authenticate. Regarding the temporal tampering, 
with the TID we can know the correct temporal orders. 
If attackers forger a TID and disorder or replace the 
frames, the Q/S based hashing can do the authentication 
works. In [5, 6] three transcoding include re-
quantization, frame resizing and dropping had been 
considered. In H.264/SVC we firstly considered key 
frames in two cases, one is changed with diffe rent 
resolution (spatial change) and t he other is same 
resolution with different quality (quality change). The 
latter case is fu rther divided into different CGS layer 
and MGS layer. 
a) The invariance feature between frames with sam e 
resolution in different CGS layers 
In H.264/SVC, 4x4 blocks are adopted and transformed 
into the matrix with16 DCT coefficients. Each 
coefficient is quantized by a same quantization step. In 
key frame intra 4x4 blocks (denoted by Io) should be 
intra coded by different intra prediction modes, the intra 
prediction pixel block’s difference is denoted by Po and 
residual blocks are tra nsformed into DCT coefficients 
we denoted by r in Figure 2. The r then quantized by Q1 
and denoted the quantization noise is ]2/,2/[ 111 QQ−∈Δ , so 
1Δ−= rb                                      (1) 
And denoted quantization noise introduced by Q2 
is ]2/,2/[ 222 QQ−∈Δ , so 
2Δ−=+ rba                                  (2) 
And when decoding in different quality layers at 
receiver, [Po+IDCT(a+b)]should be with the same 
visual feature as the [Po+IDCT(b)] except that different 
quantization distortion (in Figure 3). 
HighQ
LowQ
0P
0P
0I
 Fig.2. Quality scalability coding in H.264/SVC. 
 
Due to m any AC coe fficients are ze ro especial those 
high frequency ones a fter quantization, the features 
extracted from the group of DCT coefficients are more 
robust than s ingle DCT coefficient and preferable 
selected units for producing perceptual hash, And it can 
be predicted that with the increasing of the number of 
blocks, the invariance relation of DCT frequency energy 
in the group pair can b e maintained due to the 
quantization distortion can be regarded as the noise with 
mean value is zero, which can be  obtained by the 
Dempster-Shafer Evidence Theory (D-S) theory.  D-S 
theory considers one or more evidences to enhance the 
information and decrease the uncertainty. In this paper, 
we can ensure the robust of features and enhance image 
quality and en ergy. Firstly, D-S th eory considers the 
frame of discernment, in this paper, the frame of 
discernment is composed of group DCT coefficients, 
and we can combine these together to get better features. 
Dempster-Shafer theory has five related concepts: basic 
probability assignment (BPA), co mbine rules, belief, 
plausibility, and belief interval [27]. 
z BPA 
A basic probability assignment (BPA) rep resents the 
degree of supporting for a piece of evidence. Its 
definition is as following: 
( ) 0m φ =  and  
2
( ) 1
A
m A
Θ∈
=∑  
According to the definition, a BPA for {A, B} 
represents the degree of supporting for {A, B}, not {A} 
or {B}, or the sum of BPA of {A} and {B}.The sum of 
all BPAs will equal 1.0.  In this paper, we consider the 
rate of visual feature in th e total layer as t he input of 
BPA. 
z Combine Functions 
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Multiple evidences can be co mbined using D-S 
combination rule shown in following equation (1) and 
(2), which is also  called th e orthogonal sum of 
evidences or mass function, shown as following: 
1 2 nm=m m ... m⊕ ⊕ ⊕                               (1) 
1
1
0 ( )
( )
( )
( )
1 ( )
i
i
n
i i
A A i
n
i i
A i
X Y
m A
m A
X Y
m A
φ
φ
φ∩ = =
∩ = =
∩ =⎧⎪⎪⎪= ⎨ ∩ ≠⎪⎪ −⎪⎩
∑ ∏
∑∏
  (2) 
 
Through the combine functions, we can get the 
comprehensive features from the group of DCT  
coefficient and make the features more robust. 
z Belief Function 
Belief represents the total support for a h ypothesis, and 
will be drawn fro m the BPAs for all subsets o f that 
hypothesis. The b elief function is defined as equation 
(3). 
( ) ( )
B A
Bel A m B
⊆
= ∑                          (3) 
Through the belief function, we can get the feature 
extracted from the single DCT coefficient, which is 
shown as probability. 
z Plausibility Function 
In contrast to belief, plausibility represents the degree to 
which a h ypothesis cannot be disbelieved or false. 
Unlike the case in Bayesian probability theory, disbelief 
is not the complement of belief, but represents the 
degree of support for all hypotheses that do not intersect 
with that hypothesis. For each Aك 2 hΘ , plausibility 
function is defined as:
  ( ) ( )
B A
Pls A m B
φ∩ ≠
= ∑                  (4) 
Through the plausibility function, we can get the degree 
of feature that different quantization distortion. 
 
z Belief Interval 
The above measures provide DS theory with an explicit 
measurement of ignorance about a hy pothesis and its  
complement sets. Belief in terval is d efined as an  
interval [Bel(A), Pls(A)][28]. This can also b e 
interpreted as the imprecision on the ‘true probability’ 
of A. 
 
 
Figure 2. The relation between Bel and Pls 
 
The final belief, plausibility, and belief interval for each 
of the hypotheses can the n be calculated based on the 
basic probability assignment using the above equations. 
Ignorance for the whole set can also be derived. In most 
cases, after a dding new evidence, the ignorance is 
reduced [29]. Based on DS theory combination rule, 
more than two hypotheses can be integrated. 
When hypotheses are c ombined by m ultiple pieces of 
evidence, the DS theory can be used to fuse these 
evidences. The final result represents the synthetic 
effects of all evidences [30].  
b) The invariance feature between frames with sam e 
resolution with different MGS quality 
108
2
2
4
0
0 0
0 0
0 0 0
000
0
 
Fig.3. DCT coefficients discarding in zig-zag order with 
MGS layer. 
 
We divided n blocks into 2 gr oups with n/2 blocks 
respectively. These n blocks can be generated one 
feature bit according to th e different energy (DE) 
between two groups (basic idea can be referred in [18]). 
It can be expected that the relation of different energy of 
two groups are invariance as long as the proper n value 
is given, even if some higher frequency coefficients in 
certain MGS packet will be d iscarded when quality 
switch, due to the DC c oefficients are m ost important 
and usually largest coefficients in 4x4 intra blocks. 
c) The relation of residual DCT energy in same key 
frames with different resolutions 
The energy of different block groups reflects the content 
of video frame such as edges, textures and flat 
characteristic. It can be expected that the relation of DE 
will be invariant to the scaling of video frames, which is 
the same as in the different quality layers. However, in 
the H.264/SVC bit streams, the residual DCT 
coefficients in highe r spatial layer are based on the 
frame difference predicted from the fram e up-sampled 
from base l ayer, and the quantization factors is even 
different in respective spatial layer. So  the statistica l 
relation between the residual DCT energy and the intra 
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residual DCT en ergy in differen t spatial layers is 
complex and difficult to describe directly from exist 
compressed data. In t his paper we only consider 
different quality based invariance relation feature and 
different resolution based one will b e studied in fu ture 
work. 
 
 
Fig.4. Key frames of “Foreman” and “Mobile” with 
different resolution (CIF and QCIF). 
 
So we generate different perceptual hash according to 
different spatial layers and  attach the hash bits within 
one frame. Each hashing bit sequence can b e sensitive 
to tampers in frame with respective resolutions and can 
further tell the location of tampered blocks group. If I= 
{I1, I2 ... IM ...} are the input N video key frames and 
then bi are the 4x4 pixel blocks within one key frame. 
Denote the energy of one block Ei as follow, jλ is the 
weighting factor of the j-th DCT coefficient. 
]15,0[,
15
0
2 ∈=∑ jCE jji λ
                     (4) 
 
Select n bl ocks according t o the m ethod in [18], the  
total energy of sub-group A or B with n/2 blocks and 
the energy of whole group A+B then can be denoted as 
follow. 
]2/,1[,
2/
1
niEE
n
iAorB ∈=∑
                       (5) 
 
],1[,
1
niEE
n
iBA ∈=∑+
                         (6) 
 
Different from feature bit generating method, the ratio 
of group DCT energy difference (RDE) is utilized here. 
So the final robust feature bit can be extracted as (l 
denote group index and l
τ
denote threshold for group l): 
 
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
>−
≤−
=
+
+
l
BA
BA
l
BA
BA
l
E
EE
if
E
EE
if
f
τ
τ
,1
,0
                     (7) 
 
And final perceptual hash bit sequence was produced by 
encryption algorithm E (.), r denotes certain resolution 
and K= {k1, k2... km...} denote the secret key sequence 
assigned for different key frame M to generate secure 
perceptual hash Hr. 
,...}2,1{...},,...,{),( 21 ∈== rfffFFEH rlrrrrKr      (8) 
 
MGS packet
MGS layer
Spatail or
CGS layer
Video frame
Perceptual Hash
 Feature
extraction
Hash Computing
analyzed and
voting
 Fig.5. Authenticating a video frame from spatial and 
quality layer. 
 
When authenticating MGS frame, total of MGS layer 
should be together to construct one complete block 
coefficients sequence, include every coefficients such as 
first 3, latter 3 an d at last 10  ones in zigzag order (in 
figure 3). The video frame based authentication scheme 
can be described as f igure 5, in which one h ash bits 
sequence denoted the content of one res olution frame. 
All the results based on the every hash bits sequence are 
finally analyzed and voted to outcome the decision. 
 
4.     Simulation and Analysis 
We simulate three types of test video, namely 
“Foreman”, “Mobile” (Figure 4), and encoded them 
using H.264/SVC reference software, called JSVM. 
Each encoded stream consists of f our temporal layers 
(GoP size 8) and two spatial layers providing CIF and 
QCIF resolutions. The first frame (frame 0) is the key I 
frame of GOP which was utilized to extract perceptual 
hash.  
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Table 1. Experiment parameters for authentication scheme 
Test Video 
Foreman 
(QCIF) 
Foreman 
(CIF) 
Mobile 
(QCIF) 
Resolution 176x144 352x288 176x144 
DCT feature Ratio of DE Ratio of DE Ratio of DE 
Block size 4x4 4x4 4x4 
Group size 16x16 32x32 16x16 
Weighting factor j
λ
 
{0.8, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 
1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1}
{0.8, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 
1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1}
{1,0.7,0.7,0.7,1,1,1,1,1
,1,1,1,1,1,1,1} 
Threshold l
τ
 0.1 0.1 0.09 
Key I frame index 0 0 0 
P-Hashing bit length 99 99 99 
Authentication unit 
16x16 
pixel block 
32x32 
pixel block 
4x4 
pixel block 
Feature matching 
when quality changes 
All bits Except 2 bit All bits 
Tamper type Delete and replacement - - 
Number of P-hashing 
per key I frame 
number of 
Spatial layers 
- 
number of 
Spatial layers 
 
A) The invariance of RDE based Q-hashing in 
deferent quality layers 
From the feature extraction experiment, in 4 quality 
frames reconstructed from 4 layers we can get (base 
layer, CGS, MGS1, and MGS2) 4 feature RDE value 
sequence. In figure 6, the threshold l
τ
are all 0.1, and the 
weighting factor ]15,0[, ∈jjλ is {0.8, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1… 
1}. It can be seen that according to every group index 
four feature points are all located in one side of 
threshold line. This is the best result and so all hash bits 
sequence generated in formula (7) are all matched. The 
results verified our RDE feature based P-hashing is 
quality scalability and adaptive to SVC coding. We 
further encoded and decoded test video “Mobile” in 
figure 6, set the weighting factor j
λ
={1, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 1, 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}, the l
τ
 are all 0.09 and get 
the same best results (all hashing bits are m atched). 
However, when applied these into the cif of “foreman”, 
there are two groups unmatched. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Block group index
th
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V
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f e
ne
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y 
di
ffe
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nc
e 
ra
tio
 (
 th
re
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d 
=0
.0
9)
the Feature value sequence of different quality Layer with same resolution(weight=1)
 
 
Base Layer CGS Layer MGS1 Layer MGS2 Layer Threshold line
 
Figure 6. The invariance of RDE between different quality frames (Base, CGS, MGS1, and MGS2) 
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Then we generated corresponding feature hashing bits 
from several key frame sequences of “foreman” 
including frame 1, 9, 17, 25, 33, 41 and 49, without 
tampering. And comparing the feature hashing bits 
extracted from base layer w ith different quality layer 
(CGS, MGS1, and MGS2) as well as spatial layer (CIF), 
the mean value of the verification ratio can be shown as 
Table 2. The verification ratio means how many video 
authentication units can be verified without any 
malicious modifications. The experiment results 
maintain above high ratio to some extent which verified 
the efficiency of the proposed scheme. 
 
Table 2. Mean verification ratio of Key frame sequences 
(1, 9, 17, 25, 33, 41 and 49) 
Mean verification 
ratio  
Foreman Mobile 
Base layer 100% 100% 
CGS 97.4% 97.11% 
MGS1 97.98% 98.56% 
MGS2 95.53% 95.67% 
Spatial Layer (CIF) 95.09% 94.81% 
 
B) The sensitive of RDE to content tampers 
At first, we verified the efficient of our scheme through 
two classical ta mpers including del eting and 
replacement attacks in two blocks contents in base layer 
frame and deleting attacks in respective quality frame 
(CGS, MGS 1 and M GS 2). The attacks and 
authentication results are sh own in figure 7 and 8. In 
figure 7 (a) and (b), the two top and left blocks were 
directly deleted or dedicate replaced with sophisticated 
contents, and both modified locations can be remarked 
in the figure 7 (c) and (d) in our proposed scheme. 
Secondly, according to the related two forging attacks 
(superimposing attack and picture in picture attack) 
proposed in [26], we tested the sensitive of our proposed 
RDE based perceptual hashing to these attacks methods 
which can prov ide different attacks intensity by 
adjusting the factor. The authenticated video is Foreman, 
attack video is Akiyo. In table 3, the RDE feature based 
hashing bit error rate (FER) in different quality and 
spatial layers under different attacks was given. For 
better describing the performance of R DE hashing to 
Pic-in Pic attacks, here in the b) of table 3 we used the 
globe FER and local FER to indicate the feature hashing 
bits changes under attacks with different intensity. It is 
obvious that the size a  of Pic-in-Pic attacks can be used 
to convert eac h other between Globe FER and L ocal 
FER. It can be seen that increasing the mf and a, 
increase the Globe FER values with no exceptions. 
However, the local FER decreased when the size of Pic- 
in-Pic attacks increase d. This is because the 
modification area becam e smaller so that the rate  
became smaller with the same mismatch feature bits. 
Our one authentication unit is 16x16 block size. 
Comparing with the normal verification ratio, the 
superimposing attacks can be di scriminated from the 
FER values due to the lowest FER is 13.97% which was 
higher than the normal ratio (100%-94.81%=5.19%). 
Nevertheless, in Pic-in-Pic attacks, the situation was 
more complex when the attack a rea decreased to 1/16 
and below. Here the globe and local FER should be both 
 
 
Figure 7. Tampers (delete and replacement) in base 
layer frame 0 and authentication 
 
Figure 8. Tampers (delete) in respective quality frame 0 
CGS1 frame 0 MGS1 frame 0 MGS2 frame 0 
Delete in CGS Delete in MGS1 Delete in MGS2 
CGS 
Authentication 
MGS1 
Authentication 
MGS2 
Authentication 
c) Authentication 
location 
b) Replacement in 
Base layer frame 0
d) Authentication 
location 
a) Delete in Base 
layer frame 0
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and authentication results 
 
considered. So the local RDE hashing bit further 
extracted to judge whether some area are noise or 
intended modifications. And the local FER were 
basically high under the local attacks such as Pic-in-Pic 
attacks (above 50%) or deleting or replacement and etc 
(in Figure 7 and Figure 8). 
 
Globe FER=mismatch feature bits/Total number of 
authentication units                (9) 
Local FER= mismatch feature bits/Total number of 
authentication units/a              (10) 
 
Figure 9. Foreman-Akiyo Superimposing attack using a 
merge factor (from left to right 0.2, 0.5, 0.8) 
 
 
Figure 10. Foreman-Akiyo Picture in picture attack 
using a factor (from left to right 1/4, 1/16, 1/64) 
 
 
Figure 11. Mobile- Akiyo Superimposing attack using a 
merge factor (from left to right 0.2, 0.5, 0.8) 
 
 
Figure 12. Mobile- Akiyo Picture in picture attack using 
a factor (from left to right 1/4, 1/16, 1/64) 
 
Table 3. Mean error bit rate of RDE based hashing of 
Key frame sequences (1, 9, 17, 25, 33, 41 and 49) under 
different attacks 
 
a) Superimposing attacks 
Foreman/Akiyo Mobile/Akiyo Superimposing Attacks
intensity Global FER Global FER 
mf=0.2 13.97% 17.58% 
mf=0.5 39.95% 43.89% 
mf=0.8 44.34% 48.24% 
 
b) Picture in picture attacks 
Foreman/Akiyo Mobile/Akiyo Pic-in-Pic 
Attacks 
intensity 
Global  
FER  
Local  
FER 
Global  
FER 
Local  
FER 
         a=1/4 12.30% 49.18% 12.94% 42.70% 
         a=1/16 4.47% 59.00% 4.57% 50.27% 
         a=1/64 1.30% 85.71% 1.88% 93.06% 
 
C) Related measure matrix compared with the 
SvcAuth scheme in [10] using JSVM platform. 
 
Table 4. Comparison measure matrix 
Performance Q P-Hashing Scheme SvcAuth 
Computation Cost 
Real time 
(synchronization to 
encoding and 
decoding) 
higher 
Robustness Against 
Loss 
Can be Robust to 
MGS layer discarding 
good 
Communication 
Overhead 
99bits per Spatial 
layer in one I frame 
Very high 
 
The robustness and sensitive of the perceptual 
hashing are the two key points in designing 
authentication scheme. These performances are base d 
on the feature selection and extraction. In this p aper we 
used ratio of different energy of group blocks to extract 
the robust feature and computed one hashing sequence 
for each quality frame. The e xperimental results show 
that this energy ratio based hashing has good perceptual 
characteristics and ro bust to fram e quality changes in 
H.264/SVC while sensitive to content tampering such as 
deleting and replacement. At same time, the P-hashing 
can further s how the tampers location. In prev ious 
method, even a bit modification can c hange the final 
signature and the authentication result. This is the major 
difference of content based authentication from 
cryptology schemes. Due to generating one hashing for 
different quality layers, the computation cost and 
overhead caused by hash bits data was greatly reduced 
(in Table 2). However, we should notice that the 
discrimination of R DE based P-Hashing between 
robustness and sen sitive is still n ot so smart when all 
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tampers case are considered. In future works we will 
consider the dynamic adaptive threshold and revise the 
weighting factor and expect to get better results, 
especially in different spatial layers. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we proposed a scalable robust perceptual 
hashing (P-Hashing) scheme which can be used in the 
scalable video stream authentication. Our feature based 
P-Hashing was designed adaptively to quality scalability 
and resolution scalability simultaneously, so that some 
invariance can b e achieved between different quality 
layers and spatial layers in the latest H.264 /SVC coding 
structure which was verified in the experiments. It can 
be seen in th e simulations that the m alicious 
modification and coding noises can be discriminated 
using this scalable P-hashing. Comparing with previous 
works in scalable video authentication [10, 11], the 
proposed scheme is m ore efficient in th e computation 
cost and robustness and communication overload. In the 
experiments we used the ratio of different energy as the 
features to construct P-Hashing. Here some improve 
feature extraction and optimal algorithms need to be 
applied in th is scheme in future works as written  in 
experiment analysis. How t o achieve better tradition 
between robustness and sensitivity is th e key p oint of 
the scalable video authentication and the feature 
extraction is the most important works should be done 
firstly in the future works. Consequently a set of DCT 
or others suitable features extracted from H.264/SVC 
coding data will b e applied in the next step compared 
experiment and be analyzed.  
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